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NOTE 
JUDICIAL LIMITATION OF THE  
EPA’S OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY  
IN CLEAN WATER ACT PERMITTING 
OF MOUNTAINTOP MINING  
VALLEY FILLS 
Christopher D. Eaton* 
Mountaintop removal mining operations in the Appalachian region have  
expanded significantly in recent decades. The practice decimates the mountain 
ecosystems by leveling forests, filling headwater streams, and producing signifi-
cant runoff of heavy metals, sediment, and other pollutants that impair the 
aquatic environment of entire watersheds. Yet environmental permitting of the 
practice is relatively limited. A recent trend in litigation aimed at halting mining 
operations has involved challenging permits that authorize the discharge of  
mining overburden into headwater streams pursuant to the Clean Water Act 
(CWA). The Army Corps of Engineers has assumed jurisdiction over such  
discharges under section 404 of the CWA, asserting that overburden is “fill  
material.” Initial litigation on the matter challenged the Corps’ assumption of  
jurisdiction, asserting instead that overburden is a “pollutant,” the discharge of 
which is regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under section 
402 of the CWA. After the courts upheld the Corps’ interpretation that overbur-
den is fill, the issue became the degree to which section 404 allows or requires the 
EPA to exercise environmental oversight of the Corps’ permitting process. The 
EPA has recently attempted to increase its oversight role by establishing proce-
dures to review permit applications before the Corps issues the permits and by 
retroactively “vetoing” existing permits that it has found result in irreparable  
environmental damage. Those actions have been subjected to challenges by the 
mining industry, which have produced court rulings constraining the EPA’s  
oversight authority. 
In this Note, I argue that Congress did not intend for mining overburden to 
fall within the purview of the Corps’ section 404 jurisdiction, and that the cases 
affirming the Corps’ assumption of such jurisdiction were wrongly decided.  
Assuming, however, that those cases will not be overturned, I argue that the EPA 
must be afforded the ability to exercise the oversight authority inherent in section 
                                                                                                                      
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, May 2013. I would especially 
like to thank University of Michigan Professor David Uhlmann for his valuable feedback 
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404 to ensure that the Corps’ permits for mountaintop removal mining valley fills 
do not result in undue environmental damage. I assert that the recent decisions 
in National Mining Association v. Jackson and Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. 
EPA improperly read limits into the EPA’s oversight authority, and that the 
courts of appeals should overturn those decisions. Absent the EPA’s second layer 
of environmental review of section 404 permitting, the fragile Appalachian 
landscape may be permanently destroyed as a consequence of mountaintop  
removal mining. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As coal deposits became more difficult to access using traditional min-
ing methods, mine operators turned to mountaintop removal mining in the 
early 1990s.1 Mountaintop removal mining involves dynamiting the tops off 
mountains to get to the coal deposits below, and depositing the mountain-
top rubble into adjacent valleys. 2  This practice decimates Appalachian 
ecosystems.3 The impacts on the environment are numerous. 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Sam Evans, Voices From the Desecrated Places: A Journey to End Mountaintop Removal 
Mining, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 523–24 (2010). 
 2. In fact, mining in central Appalachia moves more tons of earth per year than any 
other human activity or natural process anywhere else in the United States. Roger LeB. 
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The most visible impact is the destruction of extensive tracts of decidu-
ous forests that once stood on Appalachia’s rolling mountains.4 The complex 
topography of the Appalachian Mountains has created a diversity of habitats 
and forest types.5 These forests support “some of the highest biodiversity in 
North America.”6 Yet that biodiversity is threatened by the destruction of 
forest habitat. In 2005, the EPA estimated that mountaintop mining would 
remove 6.8% of Appalachian forest habitat between 1992 and 2012.7 
Much of the ecological value of Appalachian forests is derived from 
their interior (as opposed to edge) character.8 Appalachian forests are gen-
erally “spatially extensive with little disturbance imposed by other uses of 
the land.”9 This allows the forests to limit nutrient pollution to aquatic 
systems, increase moisture in the surrounding atmosphere, and provide 
more habitat.10 Notably, “[t]he Appalachian Mountains . . . contain the 
only extensive region [in the world] of interior forest at middle latitudes.”11 
Mountaintop mining destroys the interior nature of these forests by essen-
tially creating donut holes at the mining sites.12 It increases edge forest, 
which tends to allow for establishment of exotic species and to reduce habi-
tat for shade-tolerant native plants.13  
The rocky material removed during the mountaintop removal mining 
process has to go somewhere, so mining operators dump it into adjacent 
                                                                                                                      
Hooke, Spatial Distribution of Human Geomorphic Activity in the United States: Comparison with 
Rivers, 24 EARTH SURFACE PROCESSES & LANDFORMS 687, 690 fig.1(a) (1999). 
 3. See generally M.A. Palmer et al., Mountaintop Mining Consequences, 327 SCI. 148 
(2010); MICHAEL SHNAYERSON, COAL RIVER (2008). 
 4. The terms Appalachia or Appalachian are general terms that may be used to refer 
to broad or specific regions in an area stretching from northern Georgia through Pennsylva-
nia, and even as far north as Maine. As used in this Note, however, Appalachia and 
Appalachian refer to the coal mining regions of northeastern Tennessee, eastern Kentucky, 
West Virginia, and western Virginia. 
 5. William J. McShea et al., Mesic Deciduous Forest as Patches of Small-Mammal 
Richness Within an Appalachian Mountain Forest, 84 J. OF MAMMOLOGY 627, 628 (2003). 
 6. Palmer et al., supra note 3, at 148; see also, e.g., THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, 
RIVERS OF LIFE: CRITICAL WATERSHEDS FOR PROTECTING FRESHWATER BIODIVERSITY 
25–27 (Lawrence L. Master et al. eds., 1998) (describing the Clinch River watershed in south-
west Virginia and east Tennessee as “[t]he nation’s leading hot spot of aquatic diversity”). 
 7. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MOUNTAINTOP MINING/VALLEY FILLS IN 
APPALACHIA: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4 (2005) [here-
inafter PEIS], available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=20005XA6.PDF. 
 8. J.D. Wickham et al., The Effect of Appalachian Mountaintop Mining on Interior Forest, 
22 LANDSCAPE ECOL. 179, 180 (2007). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Kurt Riitters et al., Global-Scale Patterns of Forest Fragmentation, 4 ECOL. & SOC’Y 
3 (2000). 
 12. See Wickham et al., supra note 8, at 180–81. 
 13. Id. at 186. 
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valleys, which typically contain headwater streams. Headwater streams 
“provide a refuge from predators and changes in temperature . . . and can 
be important spawning and nursery grounds” for aquatic biota.14 Appalachi-
an streams, in particular, “are recognized as a biodiversity hot spot of global 
significance, particularly for endemic aquatic salamanders and mussels.”15 
Like the forests, these streams are not merely “impaired” by mountaintop 
mining, but are completely eliminated. The EPA estimated that 1200 miles 
of streams were “directly impacted” by valley fills between 1992 and 2002, 
and that 724 miles of streams were completely covered by valley fills be-
tween 1985 and 2001.16  
Filling of headwater streams has further reaching effects beyond the 
elimination of those stream segments; it cuts off important sources of nu-
trients to lower stream segments, harming aquatic organisms.17 Declines in 
downstream biodiversity have subsequently been linked to upstream valley 
fills.18 In addition to cutting off nutrients, valley fills deposit metals and 
other pollutants into the downstream flow.19 This depositional effect is 
exacerbated by the removal of forests on adjacent slopes; those forests 
would normally filter pollutants from runoff.20 The deposited pollutants 
ultimately kill downstream aquatic and streamside vegetation.21 Runoff 
increases turbidity (suspended solids) in streams,22 which can suffocate 
aquatic biota and block sunlight from reaching aquatic plants.23 Heavy 
metals can bioaccumulate (i.e., intensify in concentration as predators con-
sume contaminated prey) in aquatic food webs and can kill or deform fish 
and birds that feed on contaminated prey.24 Once surface mining impacts at 
least 5.4% of the area in a watershed, the entire aquatic ecosystem in that 
watershed is likely to become “biologically impaired.”25 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Emily S. Bernhardt & Margaret A. Palmer, The Environmental Costs of Mountaintop 
Mining Valley Fill Operations for Aquatic Ecosystems of the Central Appalachians, 1223 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 39, 41 (2011). 
 15. Id. at 39; see also THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 6, at 25. 
 16. PEIS, supra note 7, at 4. 
 17. Palmer et al., supra note 3, at 148. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id.; see also Bernhardt & Palmer, supra note 14, at 46–48. 
 20. See Wickham et al., supra note 8, at 180. 
 21. See Palmer et al., supra note 3, at 148. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See generally R.J. Davies-Colley & D.G. Smith, Turbidity, Suspended Sediment, and 
Water Clarity: A Review, 37 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 1085 (2001). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Emily S. Bernhardt et al., How Many Mountains Can We Mine? Assessing the 
Regional Degradation of Central Appalachian Rivers by Surface Coal Mining, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. 8115, 8120 (2012). “Biologically impaired” as used by Bernhardt et al. is based on a set 
of biodiversity scores used by the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection. 
Id. at 8119. 
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Even after mining operations have ended, recovery of stream ecosys-
tems is slow or nonexistent.26 The destruction of mountain streams is often 
justified on the grounds that mining operators will mitigate the effects by 
improving stream habitat in nearby regions or remediating impacted 
streams after mining operations cease.27 However, anthropogenic habitat 
augmentation generally provides negligible benefits, and remediation pro-
duces streams that are significantly less productive and provide inadequate 
habitat compared to pre-mining ecosystems.28 Once a landscape has been 
impacted by mountaintop removal mining, it may never return to its prior 
state.29 
Despite the catastrophic impacts of mountaintop removal mining on 
Appalachian forests and streams, environmental review of project permits is 
limited. Most permitting for mountaintop mining is done by state agencies 
that have assumed responsibility from the Federal Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement to implement requirements of the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).30 Federal permitting is 
limited to regulation of discharges into navigable waters under the Clean 
Water Act (CWA). SMCRA requires mine operators to return the impact-
ed lands to the “approximate original contour” (AOC) after mining is 
complete.31 However, because the rock blasted from the mountain “swells” 
15 to 25 percent upon removal, excess fill material exists after returning the 
land to its AOC.32 Mining operators must either truck the fill offsite, which 
is prohibitively expensive, or dump it in adjacent valleys, which typically 
contain streams subject to CWA jurisdiction. Therefore, mining operations 
cannot proceed without being permitted to dump mining overburden in 
adjacent valleys, which has made this practice a target of groups seeking to 
block mountaintop removal mining. After failing to block valley fills under 
the buffer zone rule of SMCRA,33 environmental groups turned their at-
tacks in the early 2000s to CWA permits required for the fills.  
                                                                                                                      
 26. Palmer et al., supra note 3, at 149. 
 27. See Evans, supra note 1, at 539. 
 28. Palmer et al., supra note 3, at 149. 
 29. See Bernhardt & Palmer, supra note 14, at 39 (“There is, to date, no evidence to 
suggest that the extensive chemical and hydrologic alterations of streams by [valley fills] can 
be offset or reversed by currently required reclamation and mitigation practices.”). 
 30. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1256 (2006). 
 31. Id. § 1265(b)(3). 
 32. Sara Clark, In Brief, In the Shadow of the Fourth Circuit: Ohio Valley Environmental 
Coalition v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 143–44 (2008) 
(describing the process of blasting and expansion that results in overburden). 
 33. See Bragg v. Robertson (Bragg I), 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), vacated 
sub nom. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n (Bragg II), 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001). The buffer zone 
rule prohibits disruption of any area within 100 feet of a stream by mining operations, unless 
the permitting authority has made certain determinations that the activity will not adversely 
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The CWA makes it unlawful to discharge any pollutant into a navigable 
water of the United States “[e]xcept as in compliance” with the Act.34 Dis-
charges are governed by complementary permitting programs: under 
section 402, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may issue per-
mits for the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters, and under section 
404, the Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) may issue permits for the 
discharge of dredge or fill material into navigable waters. The text of the 
CWA, however, does not delineate a clear boundary between the agencies’ 
respective jurisdictions. 
The Corps’ section 404 authority was originally added to the CWA by 
the House of Representatives in order to preserve the Corps’ existing role 
under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 of ensuring that navigability was 
not impaired by discharges of fill or dredge material.35 Despite the apparent 
limited nature of this grant, the Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction under the 
CWA has expanded to encompass waters that are not navigable in fact, such 
as wetlands and intermittent streams.36 In addition, the CWA does not 
define what constitutes “dredge or fill material.” 
Early litigation, therefore, dealt with whether the EPA or the Corps 
was the proper agency to regulate discharge of mining overburden into 
Appalachian headwater streams.37 Mining operators sought fill permits 
from the Corps, rather than discharge permits from the EPA, a practice 
that was upheld by the Fourth Circuit in Kentuckians for the Commonwealth 
v. Rivenburgh (Kentuckians II).38 
After Kentuckians II, the issue remains as to what, if any, role the EPA 
plays in oversight of the Corps’ permitting.39 Recognizing that the Corps’ 
section 404 role is limited, Congress provided for EPA oversight of the 
Corps’ permitting in that section.40 The EPA is authorized to promulgate 
                                                                                                                      
affect the environment. See 30 C.F.R. § 816.57 (2012); see also W. VA. CODE R. § 38-2-5.2 
(2001). 
 34. Clean Water Act (CWA) § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 35. See Sen. Consideration of the Rep. of the Conf. Comm., Oct. 4, 1972, Amend-
ment of Fed. Water Pollution Control Act, 93d Cong., reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at 177 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Senate Consideration]. 
 36. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 37. See Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh (Kentuckians I), 204 F. 
Supp. 2d 927 (S.D. W.Va. 2002), rev’d, (Kentuckians II) 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 38. 317 F.3d at 448. 
 39. Evans has argued that because Kentuckians II was wrongly decided, the EPA can 
and should use rulemaking to assert its authority over the discharge of mining overburden. 
Evans, supra note 1, at 543, 555. Although I do not disagree with Evans’ assessment, I assume 
in this Note that Kentuckians II remains good law until it is overturned, and that the EPA 
will not assume jurisdiction over discharges of mining overburden in the foreseeable future. 
 40. See Senate Consideration, supra note 35, at 177. 
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guidelines for the Corps to follow in issuing permits,41 to veto or limit 
permits approved by the Corps,42 and to enter into an agreement with the 
Corps to assure that delays in the issuance of section 404 permits are min-
imized.43 Read broadly, these provisions give the EPA a significant role in 
limiting adverse environmental impacts of valley fills. However, recent 
court decisions have constrained the EPA’s oversight authority in section 
404 permitting. 
In this Note, I examine the role of the EPA in regulating valley fills 
under the CWA. In Part I, I discuss the legislative history of section 404 
and subsequent case law interpreting the extent to which that section ap-
plies to discharges of mining overburden. In Part II, I assess prior and 
prospective coordination between the EPA and the Corps in review of 
section 404 permits, and examine the recent National Mining Association v. 
Jackson cases (National Mining I and II),44 which appear to limit this coordi-
nation. In Part III, I examine the EPA’s authority under section 404(c) as a 
possible limit on the Corps’ power, and the scope of the EPA’s power in 
light of Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, as well as the potential outcome of 
the appeal of this case.45 I conclude that the EPA has discretionary authori-
ty to serve an important oversight role in the Corps’ section 404 permitting 
process to avoid excess environmental damage, but that the courts have 
erroneously limited the EPA’s power delegated by Congress. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF SECTION 404 AND THE  
SCOPE OF “FILL MATERIAL” 
Section 404 is not a model of clear legislative drafting. It is often awk-
wardly worded and its relation to other sections of the CWA can be 
unclear.46 This lack of clarity may be due, in part, to the fact that the section 
was in the House’s version of the CWA, but not in the Senate’s version. 
The House’s section 404 was retained in the final law after the Conference 
Committee reconciled the two houses’ versions of the CWA. 
The definition of “fill material” has proven particularly problematic.47 
Nowhere does the CWA define dredge or fill material as used in section 
                                                                                                                      
 41. CWA § 404(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2006). 
 42. CWA § 404(c). 
 43. CWA § 404(q). 
 44. 816 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2011); Nos. 10-1220, 11-0295, 11-0446, 11-0447, 2012 
WL 3090245 (D.D.C. July 31, 2012). 
 45. 850 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 46. See, e.g., id. (“[The parentheticals in section 404(c)] are so poorly written that it is 
difficult to ascertain what it is that they are supposed to modify.”). 
 47. For a thorough discussion of regulatory interpretation of “fill material” and the 
resulting legal and practical issues, see Evans, supra note 1, at 537–54. 
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404. However, the CWA defines “pollutant,” the discharge of which is 
regulated by the EPA, to include “dredged spoil, . . . rock, [and] sand,” the 
discharge of which are regulated under section 404.48 Nonetheless, mining 
operators have asserted that mining overburden is fill material and have 
applied to the Corps rather than the EPA for discharge permits. Opponents 
of mountaintop mining, however, assert that valley fills are more akin to 
discharges of pollutants, and that the EPA is a more appropriate agency to 
examine potential environmental impacts.49 
Congress’ intent in adding section 404 provides some guide for defin-
ing the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA. In this Part, I first 
discuss the congressional intent in adding section 404 to the CWA. I then 
argue that cases addressing the applicability of section 404 to “fill material” 
have paid little attention to this intent. Finally, I argue that the narrowness 
of the holdings in those cases leaves room for future courts to limit the 
Corps’ section 404 authority to fall closer into line with Congress’ intent. 
A. Congressional Intent 
The Senate version of the CWA treated dredged spoil the same as any 
other pollutant and vested the EPA with jurisdiction over such discharges.50 
The Conference Committee substituted that provision with section 404 
from the House bill.51 
Section 404 had its origins in a letter from the American Association of 
Port Authorities (AAPA) to Congress.52 The AAPA was concerned that 
treating dredged spoil like any other pollutant would stifle dredging opera-
tions and “would inhibit the orderly development of [the] national port 
system.”53 The letter asked that permitting of dredge projects “remain with 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as it has historically.”54 
The Corps had administered a dredge and fill permit program under its 
authority from section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.55 Section 10 con-
                                                                                                                      
 48. CWA § 502(6). 
 49. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009). 
 50. See Senate Consideration, supra note 35, at 177. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Bills Amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Other Pending Legisla-
tion Relating to Water Pollution Control: Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water 
Pollution of the Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong. app. (1971) (letter from Paul A. Amund-
sen, Executive Director, AAPA). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006); 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (1972). The Rivers and Harbors Act 
provided separate authority for the Corps to regulate the discharge of “refuse” into navigable 
waters. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006). In enacting the CWA, Congress shifted authority over the 
“refuse” program to the EPA via section 402. S. REP. NO. 94-1236, at 138 (1972) (Conf. 
Rep.), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. 
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cerns “[o]bstruction of navigable waters generally; wharves; piers, etc.; 
excavations and filling in.”56 Specifically, that section states that “it shall not 
be lawful to excavate or fill . . . any navigable water of the United States, 
unless the work has been . . . authorized by the Secretary of the Army.”57 
The purpose of that statute was to assure that navigation would be free 
from obstruction caused by fill material, structures, or other barriers.58 
Responding to the AAPA’s request, Senator Ellender from Louisiana 
offered an amendment that “simply retains the authority of the Secretary of 
the Army to issue permits for the disposal of dredged materials . . . 
[which] is essential since the Secretary of the Army is responsible for main-
taining and improving the navigable waters of the United States.”59 The 
proposed amendment failed because other senators expressed concern about 
the possible polluting effects of dredged spoil.60 
The House bill did, however, include a provision that met the AAPA’s 
concerns. With an eye towards section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 
the Conference Committee was hesitant to involve a second agency (the 
EPA) in the administration of the dredge and fill permit system.61 Accord-
ingly, it adopted the House provision as section 404 in the final version of 
the CWA. 
The legislative history makes it clear that the purpose of section 404 
was to maintain the Corps’ role from the Rivers and Harbors Act in permit-
ting discharges that may interfere with navigation. There is nothing in the 
legislative history to suggest that section 404 was intended to give the 
Corps jurisdiction over any and all discharges that have a filling effect. The 
statute itself suggests that section 404 is aimed primarily at fill that may 
obstruct navigation: section 404(b), for example, requires consideration of 
the “economic impact of the [disposal] site on navigation and anchorage.”62 
Even in preserving the Corps’ role, the Committee recognized that the 
Administrator of the EPA must still serve an important oversight function: 
First, the Administrator has both responsibility and authority 
for failure to obtain a Section 404 permit or comply with the con-
dition thereon. Section 309 authority is available because discharge 
of the “pollutant” dredge spoil without a permit or in violation of a 
permit would violate Section 301(a). 
                                                                                                                      
 56. 33 U.S.C. § 403. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See 33 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 59. 117 CONG. REC. 38,853 (1971). 
 60. See Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh (Kentuckians I), 204 F. 
Supp. 2d 927, 934 n.8 (S.D. W. Va. 2002). 
 61. See Senate Consideration, supra note 35, at 177. 
 62. CWA § 404(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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Second, the Environmental Protection Agency must determine 
whether or not a site to be used for the disposal of dredged spoil is 
acceptable when judged against the criteria established for fresh 
and ocean waters similar to that which is required under Section 403.  
Third, prior to the issuance of any permit to dispose of spoil, 
the Administrator must determine that the material to be disposed 
of will not adversely affect municipal water supplies, shellfish beds 
and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife 
or recreational areas in the specified site. Should the Administrator 
so determine, no permit may issue.63 
These statements imply a general oversight duty for the EPA in section 
404. The Committee further stated that it did “not believe there could be 
any justification for permitting the Secretary of the Army to make determi-
nation as to the environmental implications of either the site to be selected 
or the specific spoil to be disposed of in a site.”64 The Committee instead 
decided that the EPA was the appropriate authority to oversee environmen-
tal impacts of fill discharges and therefore vested the EPA with veto 
authority over the Corps’ permit decisions.65 It contemplated that permit 
applications would be “transmitted to the Administrator for review” and 
that “the Administrator [would] be expeditious in his determination” of 
whether the disposal would meet environmental standards.66 Finally, the 
Committee expressed a goal for the Corps and the EPA to work together to 
“end the process of dumping dredged spoil in water.”67 
The legislative history overall demonstrates that Congress intended the 
EPA to be the primary regulator of environmental impacts from discharges 
of fill, while the Corps’ role was to specify locations of discharge that would 
not impair navigation. Congress also contemplated that the EPA would 
review all fill permits and have the ultimate decisionmaking authority for 
those applications that failed to meet environmental standards. Section 404 
thus creates a limited carve-out in the CWA for the Corps that was derived 
from its previous authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act. The legisla-
tive history of the CWA indicates that the EPA’s administrative authority 
was intended by Congress to be limited only by those tasks specifically 
delegated to the Corps. 
                                                                                                                      
 63. Senate Consideration, supra note 35, at 177. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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B. Case Law: Mining Overburden as Fill Material 
Notwithstanding congressional intent, the text of the CWA is unclear 
with regard to which agency is responsible for permitting discharges that 
have both pollutant and fill characteristics. The overlapping definitions of 
fill and pollutant in section 502(6) are especially problematic.68 Mining 
overburden clearly meets the definition of “pollutant” in section 502(6), but 
it may also constitute “fill material” under section 404. The EPA has juris-
diction over discharges of mining overburden as a “pollutant.” The Corps 
only has jurisdiction over such discharges if mining overburden is also “fill 
material.”69  
The Kentuckians line of cases assessed whether the Corps has jurisdic-
tion over mining overburden as fill material, ultimately holding that it 
does.70 I argue that the Fourth Circuit’s decision failed to give effect to 
congressional intent, although it was arguably correct under the deferential 
Chevron standard.71 The Supreme Court in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast 
Alaska Conservation Council addressed the related issue of what happens 
when both agencies may have jurisdiction over the same discharge.72 It held 
that so long as the Corps issued a valid discharge permit, no EPA permit 
was required. Although the Court did not directly consider whether the 
Corps’ regulatory definition of “fill material” was correct on its face, it 
failed to consider the limited nature of Congress’ section 404 carve-out in 
acceding to the Corps’ jurisdiction over mining overburden. The case law 
                                                                                                                      
 68. “The term ‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, 
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materi-
als, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, 
and agricultural waste discharged into water.” CWA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006) 
(emphasis added). 
 69. The issue of what happens when both agencies may exercise jurisdiction over the 
same discharges was taken up in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 
U.S. 261 (2009), discussed infra. 
 70. Kentuckians I, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927 (S.D. W. Va. 2002).  
 71. The Supreme Court articulated the modern standard of judicial deference to 
agency interpretations of law in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984):  
[Step one:] First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence 
of an administrative interpretation. [Step two:] Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
 72. 557 U.S. 261 (2009). 
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thus represents a tentative approval of the Corps’ jurisdiction over dis-
charges of mining overburden as “fill material,” but the courts have not 
conclusively settled the matter. 
1. The Kentuckians Cases 
The Corps’ acceptance of section 404 jurisdiction for valley fills was 
first challenged in Bragg v. Robertson (Bragg I).73 Rather than ruling on the 
CWA claims for relief, the district court enjoined mining activities under 
SMCRA.74 The first court to explicitly rule on the propriety of using sec-
tion 404 permits for valley fills was the District Court for the Southern 
District of West Virginia in Kentuckians I.75  
In that case, the Corps had issued a Nationwide Permit 21 (NWP 21)76 
to Martin County Coal Corporation in June 2000 for a mining project in 
Martin County, Kentucky. 77  The environmental organization plaintiff 
                                                                                                                      
 73. 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D. W. Va. 1999). 
 74. Id. at 663. Count 17 of the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the Corps would 
violate its authority under the CWA by issuing a Nationwide Permit 21 (NWP 21) for 
Hobet Mining to fill valleys at its Spruce Fork No. 1 mine. Second Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Bragg I, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (No. 2:98-
0636), 1999 WL 33933888. Although the district court did not reach this claim, it did state 
that “[t]he Corps’ § 404 authority to permit fills in the waters of the United States does not 
include authority to permit valley fills for coal mining waste disposal.” Bragg I, 72 F. Supp 
2d at 657. The plaintiffs in a partial settlement of this case had surrendered their right to 
challenge the Corps’ assertion that mining overburden was fill material, but the court ana-
lyzed the authority sua sponte in order to decide whether SMCRA was preempted by CWA 
regulations. Id. at 657 n.29. In the settlement, the government agreed to suspend use of 
NWP 21 until the EPA, Corps, Office of Surface Mining (OSM), and U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service (FWS) prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the use of NWP 
21. See Settlement Agreement at 3–5, Bragg I, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (No. 
2:98-0636), 1998 WL 35251185. The Corps would consider section 404 permits on an  
individual basis until the EIS was completed. Id. at 4–5. 
 75. 204 F. Supp. 2d 927 (S.D. W. Va. 2002). 
 76. Under CWA § 404(e), the Corps may “issue general permits on a State, regional, 
or nationwide basis for any category of activities involving discharges of dredged or fill 
material if the Secretary determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, 
will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will 
have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.” The general permit in 
this case was issued by the Corps in 1996 on a nationwide basis for:  
[a]ctivities associated with surface coal mining activities provided they are author-
ized by the Department of the Interior, Office of Surface Mining (OSM), or by 
states with approved programs under Title V of the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 and provided the permittee notifies the District Engi-
neer in accordance with the “Notification” general condition. The notification 
must include an OSM or state approved mitigation plan.  
61 Fed. Reg. 65,874, 65,916 (Dec. 13, 1996). 
 77. Kentuckians I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 930. 
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brought a facial challenge to the Corps’ use of NWP 21 for valley fills, 
asserting that the Corps violated its own regulations and that the Corps’ 
CWA jurisdiction did not extend to fill material whose purpose was for 
waste disposal.78 The Corps’ regulations at the time defined fill material as 
“any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with 
dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of an [sic] waterbody[,]” and 
specifically excluded “any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to 
dispose of waste.”79 The district court performed an analysis under Chevron 
step one to explain that Congress had clearly indicated via the plain text, 
statutory structure, and legislative history that fill material must have a 
constructive purpose to come within the scope of section 404.80 The court 
found that the 1977 regulatory definition gave effect to Congress’ intent, 
but that it required the Corps to find that a discharge had a constructive 
purpose prior to issuing a section 404 permit for that discharge.81 Because 
the Corps acknowledged that valley fills did not serve a constructive pur-
pose, the court held that the Corps violated its own 1977 regulations.82  
Notably, the district court acknowledged that Congress had intended 
for section 404 to constitute only a limited grant of jurisdiction to the 
Corps.83 It provided a thorough discussion of the legislative history, noting 
that section 404 was primarily intended to keep dredge permitting authori-
ty with the Corps.84 The court held that the only permissible interpretation 
of section 404 in light of Congress’ intent was one where the discharge of 
dredge or fill “involved maintenance, construction, work, and structures [in 
navigable waters], not disposal of pollutants or waste.”85 
Shortly after this litigation began, the Corps issued a draft rule modify-
ing its definition of fill material to include any material that “has the effect 
of replacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry land; or 
changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United 
States.”86 Although this regulation was not yet finalized, the district court 
                                                                                                                      
 78. Id. 
 79. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (1977) (emphasis added). 
 80. See Kentuckians I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 933–37. 
 81. See id. at 937–39. 
 82. See id. at 942–43. 
 83. See id. at 936. 
 84. See id. at 933–36. 
 85. Id. at 936. 
 86. Proposed Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill 
Material” and “Discharge of Fill Material,” 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 21,299 (proposed Apr. 20, 
2000) (emphasis added). In addition, the final rule specifically stated that “[e]xamples of 
such fill material include, but are not limited to . . . overburden from mining or other 
excavation activities.” Final Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of 
“Fill Material” and “Discharge of Fill Material,” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,142 (May 9, 2002) 
(to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)). 
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held that an “effect-based” definition of fill material would expand the 
Corps’ authority beyond that conferred by the CWA, and therefore the 
proposed regulation would be invalid if issued as final.87 Because the court 
found that neither the 1977 nor the 2002 regulations authorized the use of 
section 404 permits for valley fills, it enjoined the Huntington District 
office of the Corps “from issuing any further § 404 permits that have no 
primary purpose or use but the disposal of waste,” specifically prohibiting 
issuance of permits for mountaintop removal overburden valley fills.88 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit in Kentuckians II struck down the district 
court’s ruling, holding that the injunction issued by the district court was 
“overbroad.”89 Rather than ending its discussion with the procedural failure, 
the court went on to overturn the district court’s assessment of the Corps’ 
general authority under section 404.90 The Fourth Circuit found that Con-
gress had not, in fact, spoken directly to the issue of whether fill material 
must have a purpose.91 The circuit court dismissed the district court’s dis-
cussion of legislative history, finding instead that the legislative history was 
“inconclusive” as to the meaning of “fill material.”92 Noting that “fill mate-
rial” was thus an ambiguous term, the circuit court proceeded to Chevron 
step two.93 The court held that under Chevron step two, the Corps’ 1977 
definition was a permissible construction of the ambiguous term, and the 
Corps had permissibly interpreted its own regulations in this case.94  
The Corps issued a final rule with its new definition of fill material in 
2002, which expressly included overburden from mining operations.95 The 
                                                                                                                      
 87. Kentuckians I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 945. 
 88. Id. at 946–47. 
 89. 317 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 2003). The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ 
complaint sought an injunction only for the permit issued to Martin County Coal, whereas 
the district court had issued an injunction against all similar permits from the Corps’ Hun-
tington office. 
 90. Id. at 448. Although he concurred in the judgment, Judge Luttig dissented as to 
this subsequent discussion of section 404 authority, stating, “the majority wades knee-deep, 
and without apparent hesitation, into the very issues that were improvidently decided by the 
District Court . . . .” Id. at 449. 
 91. Id. at 443–44. 
 92. Id. at 443. The circuit court stated that the scope of section 10 of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act was not clearly limited to discharge of fill that had a beneficial purpose. Id. at 
442. Therefore, even if section 10 was the predecessor to CWA section 404, that section 
could not be relied on to prove that section 404 could not apply to non-beneficial fill. Id. In 
addition, the circuit court found that the district court’s analysis of the legislative history of 
the CWA was flawed because it focused only on references to dredged spoil; that history 
could not be used to clarify any ambiguity in the definition of fill. Id. at 443. 
 93. Id. at 444. 
 94. Id. at 448. 
 95. Final Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill Material” 
and “Discharge of Fill Material,” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,142 (May 9, 2002) (to be codified at 
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)). 
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court in Kentuckians I had stated that the “effects rule” is “fundamentally 
inconsistent with the CWA, its history, predecessor statutes, longstanding 
regulations, and companion statutes.”96 In other words, the new rule would 
fail Chevron step one. The Fourth Circuit refused to discuss the effects rule, 
instead holding that “[b]ecause the district court reached beyond the issues 
presented to it in deciding [the effects rule] issue, we vacate its ruling de-
claring the New Rule to be inconsistent with § 404 of the Clean Water 
Act.”97 The circuit court’s Chevron analysis of the 1977 regulation, however, 
strongly suggests that it would give the Corps deference in its promulgation 
of the effects rule. 
As a matter of administrative law, the Kentuckians II decision was cor-
rect. The district court’s Chevron step one argument in Kentuckians I—that 
Congress intended section 404 to cover only fill with a purpose—was 
weak.98 While the legislative history of section 404 deals primarily with 
dredge spoil that results from the dredging of navigation channels, there is 
nothing to clearly indicate that Congress intended to preclude non-
constructive fill from falling under the definition of fill material. As previ-
ously noted, the statute itself provides no guidance as to what constitutes 
fill material. Under Chevron, the Kentuckians II majority was correct to defer 
to the Corps’ definition in the absence of an indication that Congress clear-
ly spoke to this question. 
However, the context in which section 404 was added and the legisla-
tive history generally suggests that the broad jurisdiction afforded to the 
Corps under the regulatory definition was not intended by Congress.99 
Congress granted broad authority to the EPA to “prepare or develop com-
prehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or eliminating the pollution 
of the navigable waters and ground waters and improving the sanitary con-
dition of surface and underground waters.” 100  The district court 
acknowledged, and the Fourth Circuit ignored, that Congress intended 
section 404 primarily to preserve the Corps’ role of preventing fill from 
obstructing navigation.101 There is nothing in the legislative history to indi-
cate that Congress intended for the Corps to exercise jurisdiction over 
discharges of mining waste into headwater streams that are not navigable in 
fact. That type of discharge seems to be exactly the sort of “rock [and] sand” 
                                                                                                                      
 96. Kentuckians I, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 945 (S.D. W. Va. 2002). 
 97. Kentuckians II, 317 F.3d at 438. 
 98. Evans has argued that Congress has clearly spoken to the definition of fill materi-
al, so that “its meaning is not ambiguous.” Evans, supra note 1, at 543. Although the 
legislative history strongly suggests that the definition of fill material is limited, the evi-
dence is circumstantial at best; it lacks an express limitation on the scope of “fill material.” 
 99. See id. 
 100. CWA § 102, 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). 
 101. See Senate Consideration, supra note 35, at 177. 
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that would fall under the section 502(6) definition of “pollutant”102 to be 
regulated by the EPA. The discharge of mining waste into headwater 
streams does not impede navigation and it has similar detrimental effects 
on stream ecosystems as a conventional pollutant.103 The overall legislative 
intent of the CWA suggests that the EPA should have some role in regulat-
ing the discharge of mining overburden. The legislative history is not clear 
enough to support a finding under Chevron step one that Congress clearly 
intended the EPA to have jurisdiction over discharge of mining burden. 
However, the general legislative history should be taken into consideration 
by courts before they limit the EPA’s oversight power. The EPA’s broad 
grant of authority must be able to push back on the Corps’ jurisdiction to 
ensure comprehensive environmental review of section 404 permits. 
2. Coeur Alaska 
The Supreme Court took up a related question in 2009 in Coeur Alaska, 
Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council: Is a section 404 permit suffi-
cient to authorize a gold mining operation to discharge a mixture of crushed 
rock, sand, and water (in other words, mining overburden/waste) into a 
navigable water, or is the operation also required to obtain a permit from 
the EPA for discharge of a “pollutant?”104 The Court stated that if the 
Corps has authority to regulate the discharge (i.e., fill material), then the 
EPA does not.105 The plaintiffs challenged the Corps’ authority to authorize 
the discharge of mining waste under the CWA.106 The Court rejected that 
claim.107 Although the Court did not directly consider the legality of the 
Corps’ regulatory definition of fill on its face, it accepted the Corps’ asser-
tion that crushed rock from mining meets that definition.108 Therefore, it 
held that the Corps has authority to issue permits for its discharge under 
section 404.109  
In so holding, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that a dis-
charge that could be subject to section 402 as a “pollutant” cannot also fall 
under the regulatory definition of fill.110 It pointed out that “§ 404 refers to 
all ‘fill material’ without qualification.”111 In accepting the regulatory defini-
tion, the Court stated that “[t]he regulatory scheme discloses a defined, and 
                                                                                                                      
 102. See supra note 68. 
 103. See generally Palmer et al., supra note 3. 
 104. See 557 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009). 
 105. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 275. 
 106. See id. at 275–76. 
 107. See id. at 277. 
 108. Id. at 275. 
 109. Id. at 277. 
 110. Id. at 276–77. 
 111. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 276. 
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workable, line for determining whether the Corps or the EPA has the per-
mit authority.”112 The Court noted that a section 402 permit may, however, 
be required for discharges of pollutants that flow from fill into downstream 
waters.113  
The Coeur decision essentially “holds” that mining tailings are fill ma-
terial based on a cursory legal analysis. The Court did not utilize a Chevron 
analysis of the regulatory definition, as did the courts in the Kentuckians 
cases, nor did it cite either Kentuckians case. Although the Court left open 
the possibility that the regulatory definition may be “an unreasonable inter-
pretation of § 404” as applied in other cases, it refused to set any limits on 
the definition.114 This approach is similar to that of the Fourth Circuit in 
Kentuckians II, where the court granted deference to the Corps’ 1977 regula-
tory definition under Chevron step two. 
The Court missed an opportunity to clarify the meaning of “fill material” 
in the CWA. In holding that the case represented a reasonable application 
of the “fill material” regulatory definition to the facts at hand, the Court 
declined to rule on the propriety of the regulatory definition on its face. 
Like the Fourth Circuit in Kentuckians II, the Court did not discuss the 
context in which section 404 was added to the CWA. It did not, in fact, 
discuss legislative history at all. It simply agreed with the Corps’ application 
of the definition as an exercise of administrative convenience (i.e. avoiding a 
two-permit system). However, the application of the definition to the facts 
would be moot if the regulation itself were found to be impermissible. 
C. Narrowing the Case Law to Give Effect to Congressional Intent 
Following Coeur, it seems that any discharge that has a filling effect, in-
cluding discharges of mining overburden, falls on the Corps’ side of the 
regulatory scheme.115 The extent of the Court’s holding is unclear, however, 
because it stated that “§ 404 does not limit its grant of power” only with 
respect to the specific facts at hand.116 The holding could be read narrowly 
to grant the Corps primary jurisdiction only over the discharge of mining 
tailings where the discharge is into a closed body of water, has only an 
                                                                                                                      
 112. Id. at 277. 
 113. See id. at 287. 
 114. Id. at 276. 
 115. The Court went on to address whether the Corps must ensure that a discharge 
under section 404 also meet pollution effluent limitations under section 306. It held that 
Congress did not intend for section 306 to apply to section 404 permits, and the agencies 
were to be afforded deference in their determination not to apply section 306 standards to 
section 404 permits. Id. at 280–86. 
 116. See id. at 276; see also Evans, supra note 1, at 549 (noting that the Court indicated 
that there “is no reason to read its opinion as a tacit approval of the current regulatory state 
of affairs”). 
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“incidental filling effect,” is in the public interest, and does not contain 
toxic pollutants.117 Alternatively, it could be read more broadly to confer 
jurisdiction to the Corps for any discharge that has a filling effect.118 The 
ambiguity in the Court’s holding leaves an avenue open for lower courts to 
rule that the Corps does not have section 404 jurisdiction based on the facts 
of a particular case. In addition, the Coeur Court did not rule on the facial 
validity of the Corps’ regulatory definition of fill. There is still room for 
lower courts to evaluate whether the regulation is a valid construction of the 
CWA. 
The Kentuckians II court did address the validity of the regulation on its 
face. However, that case dealt solely with the validity of the 1977 regulation. 
In addition, the decision is that of just one circuit, whereas mountaintop 
removal mining is also ongoing in states in the Sixth Circuit, which has yet 
to weigh in on this issue.119  
The Coeur and Kentuckians rulings do not necessarily create precedent 
that would prevent a court from vacating the Corps’ regulatory definition. 
Considering the legislative context in which section 404 was inserted into 
the CWA, it is quite possible that a facial challenge to the regulatory defini-
tion would succeed. However, until such a challenge is successfully brought, 
the Corps’ current definition of “fill material”—that any discharge that has 
a filling effect is “fill material”—is law. 
II. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE EPA AND THE CORPS  
UNDER SECTION 404 
The case law makes it clear that section 404 gives the Corps jurisdic-
tion over discharge of mining overburden for valley fills. However, that 
section also preserves a role for the EPA in the Corps’ permitting process. 
Section 404(b) directs the EPA Administrator to develop guidelines for use 
by the Corps in specifying disposal sites for individual permits (the 
“404(b)(1) Guidelines”).120 Section 404(q) requires that the Corps “enter 
                                                                                                                      
 117. See Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 284–85 (providing reasons why the Court found the 
Corps’ interpretation reasonable in this case). 
 118. See Evans, supra note 1, at 547–49 (arguing that such a broad reading of the hold-
ing creates an “absurd result”). 
 119. As of 2005, mountaintop mining was ongoing in West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennes-
see, and Virginia. Surface Mining Permits in Appalachia, ca. 2005, APPALACHIAN VOICES, 
http://ilovemountains.org/images/FAQimages/Map_Permits.jpg (last visited July 25, 2012). 
 120. See CWA § 404(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2006). The EPA guidelines are estab-
lished in 40 C.F.R. § 230 (2011). They set forth both procedural and substantive standards 
to be followed by the Corps in specifying disposal sites under both section 404(a) and 
section 404(e) (pertaining to general permits). Generally, the guidelines prohibit authoriza-
tion of discharge of dredged or fill material “unless it can be demonstrated that such a 
discharge will not have an unacceptable adverse impact either individually or in combination 
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into agreements with the Administrator [of the EPA], the Secretaries of the 
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and Transportation, and 
the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies” to streamline the permit-
ting process generally.121 The question remains whether these enumerated 
duties function as the outer limits of the EPA’s power, or whether they may 
be read in conjunction to grant the EPA a general duty of oversight in the 
section 404 process. This ambiguity has necessitated interagency agree-
ments on dispute resolution and how to share authority.  
The first agreement was entered into in 1992 and provided for vague 
coordination between the agencies.122 A subsequent agreement in 2009 and 
its associated guidance increased coordination, but both were subsequently 
struck down by the District Court for the District of Columbia in National 
Mining I and II.123 In this Part, I describe these two agreements and the 
National Mining decisions. I then argue that the National Mining court im-
properly read statutory limitations into the EPA’s ability to supervise the 
Corps’ permitting regime through section 404’s coordination provisions. 
A. 1992 Memorandum of Agreement 
The Corps and the EPA entered into a dispute resolution agreement 
(MOA) pursuant to section 404(q) in August 1992.124 Generally, the agree-
ment stated that the Corps must “fully consider EPA’s comments” in 
making its permit determination, and it established a procedure for elevat-
ing sensitive section 404 permitting decisions from the regional to the 
national offices of the EPA and the Corps.125 However, the agreement 
essentially functioned to limit the EPA’s authority in permitting decisions. 
Specifically, it asserted that “[t]he Army Corps of Engineers is solely re-
sponsible for making final permit decisions pursuant to . . . Section 404(a) 
. . . including final determinations of compliance with the Corps permit 
regulations, the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, and . . . the Endangered 
Species Act.”126 It further acknowledged the Corps’ authority to “issue [a] 
permit over the objections of the EPA Regional Administrator [and] to 
issue [a] permit without conditions recommended by the EPA Regional 
                                                                                                                      
with known and/or probable impacts of other activities affecting the ecosystems of concern.” 
40 C.F.R. § 230.1(c). 
 121. CWA § 404(q). 
 122. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the Department of the Army (Aug. 11, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 MOA], available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/1992_MOA_404q.pdf. 
 123. 816 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2011); Nos. 10-1220, 11-0295, 11-0446, 11-0447, 2012 
WL 3090245 (D.D.C. July 31, 2012). 
 124. 1992 MOA, supra note 122. 
 125. Id. at 2, 5–6. 
 126. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
Eaton_Final_WEB 1/22/2013  1:47 PM 
244 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:1 
Administrator.”127 Although the agreement established a procedure for the 
EPA to request elevation of section 404 decisionmaking from the regional 
to the national office, the 1992 MOA limited that authority only “to those 
cases that involve aquatic resources of national importance.”128 It should be 
noted, however, that the EPA did reserve its “right to proceed with Section 
404(c)” as a backstop against the final determination by the Corps.129 
B. 2009 Memorandum of Understanding 
Section 404 permitting continued under this regime with little EPA in-
volvement up until 2009. Recognizing the failed coordination among 
federal agencies in permitting mountaintop removal operations in Appala-
chia,130 the Obama administration issued a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on June 11, 2009 to implement an “Interagency Action Plan on 
Appalachian Surface Coal Mining.”131 The 2009 MOU marked a drastic 
change from the approach under the 1992 MOA, as the EPA’s role in the 
section 404 process was expanded to the point of being arguably paramount 
to that of the Corps. 
The Corps, the EPA, and Department of the Interior developed the In-
teragency Action Plan to “significantly reduce the harmful environmental 
consequences of Appalachian surface coal mining operations, while ensuring 
that future mining remains consistent with federal law.”132 The 2009 MOU 
contained four elements: interim actions, long-term regulatory actions, coor-
dinated environmental reviews, and a commitment to public participation.133 
Interim actions by the Corps and the EPA included “modify[ing]” 
NWP 21 to “preclude its use to authorize the discharge of fill material into 
streams for surface coal mining activities,” developing guidance to strength-
                                                                                                                      
 127. Id. at 5. 
 128. Id. at 6. As of 2011, the EPA had only requested higher-level review for 11 permit 
applications, out of over one million applications filed since 1992. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, EPA CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(Q) DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 
FACTSHEET, available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/404q.pdf. 
 129. 1992 MOA, supra note 122, at 9. 
 130. See Press Release, Obama Administration Takes Unprecedented Steps to Reduce 
Environmental Impacts of Mountaintop Coal Mining, Announces Interagency Action Plan 
to Implement Reforms (June 11, 2009), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/ 
wetlands/upload/2009_06_11_pdf_MTM_Release_6-11-09.pdf. 
 131. Memorandum of Understanding Among the U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. 
Department of the Interior, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Implementing the 
Interagency Action Plan on Appalachian Surface Coal Mining (June 11, 2009) [hereinafter 
2009 MOU], available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2009_06_ 
10_wetlands_pdf_Final_MTM_MOU_6-11-09.pdf. The 2009 MOU stated that it applies to 
“mining techniques requiring permits under both [SMCRA] and Section 404 of the [CWA] in 
the states of Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.” Id. at 1 n.1. 
 132. Id. at 1–2. 
 133. Id. at 2. 
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en environmental review pursuant to the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, and 
improving EPA review of discharges from valley fills under section 402.134 
Long-term regulatory goals included revising SMCRA regulations, elimi-
nating the use of NWP 21 in connection with mountaintop removal mining, 
and revising how mountaintop removal mining activities are regulated 
under the CWA.135 The 2009 MOU also established new interagency coor-
dination procedures, known as Enhanced Coordination Procedures (ECPs), 
for pending section 404 permit applications.136 The ECPs provided the 
EPA with primary environmental review (also known as Multi-Criteria 
Integrated Resource Assessment [MCIR]) of pending applications based on 
the 404(b)(1) Guidelines.137 Those applications raising concern would be 
subject to additional review and coordination by the Corps and the EPA 
(known as Enhanced Coordination [EC]).138 The Corps would be allowed 
to proceed immediately on those applications that did not raise concern.139 
The EPA issued its Final Guidance in July 2011 to strengthen the 
EPA’s environmental review of section 404 permitting using the section 
404(b)(1) Guidelines, and to improve section 402 reviews of discharges 
from valley fills.140 With regard to section 404 review, the EPA Headquar-
ters directed Regional Administrators in the Appalachian region to provide 
substantive comments to the Corps on whether a surface coal mining per-
mit application complies with five critical provisions of the section 
404(b)(1) Guidelines: (1) applicants have evaluated a full range of potential 
alternatives, (2) discharges will not cause or contribute to violations of 
water quality standards, (3) discharges will not result in significant degrada-
tion of the aquatic environment, (4) impacts to waters of the United States 
                                                                                                                      
 134. Id. at 3. 
 135. Id. at 4. 
 136. 2009 MOU, supra note 131, at 4–5. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, EPA, and Terrence “Rock” Salt, 
Acting Assistant Sec’y (Civil Works), Dep’t of the Army, to William C. Early, Acting Reg’l 
Adm’r, EPA Region III, et al., Enhanced Surface Coal Mining Pending Permit Coordination 
Procedures (June 11, 2009) [hereinafter ECP Memo], available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/ 
wetlands/pdf/Final_MTM_Permit_Coordination_Procedures_6-11-09.pdf. The language of 
the 2009 Memo seems to portray the EPA as the ultimate gatekeeper with respect to section 
404 permits with the Corps acting as the on-the-ground implementing agency. 
 139. Id. at 1. 
 140. See Memorandum from Nancy K. Stoner, Acting Assistant Adm’r for Water, and 
Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r for Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, to Shawn Garv-
in, Reg’l Adm’r, EPA Region III, Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, Reg’l Adm’r, EPA Region IV, 
and Susan Hedman, Reg’l Adm’r, EPA Region V, Improving EPA Review of Appalachian 
Surface Coal Mining Operations Under the Clean Water Act, National Environmental 
Policy Act, and the Environmental Justice Executive Order (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter Final 
Guidance], available at http://appvoices.org/images/uploads/2012/08/Final_Appalachian_ 
Mining_Guidance_07211111.pdf. 
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have been fully minimized, and (5) unavoidable impacts to aquatic resources 
have been effectively mitigated via compensatory mitigation.141 The Final 
Guidance encouraged Regional Administrators to identify where applica-
tions do not comply with these provisions and recommend changes that 
would help bring the applications into compliance.142 
The 2009 MOU and the Final Guidance represented positive steps to-
wards improving consideration of the environmental effects of valley fills. 
The environmental review of NWP 21 had been cursory at best, and, at 
worst, it completely ignored the environmental impact of valley fills.143 
Eliminating the use of NWP 21 for mountaintop removal mining in Appa-
lachia would force a “harder look” at the effects of valley fills by requiring 
individual EIS reviews. In addition, as the Bragg cases made clear, it is 
difficult to reconcile the SMCRA regulations with the relatively lax envi-
ronmental standards in section 404. If SMCRA is to continue to be 
relevant in regulating valley fills, its associated regulations must be squared 
with those under the CWA. Most importantly, the 2009 MOU would have 
given the EPA a clearer role in the review of fill permit applications. It 
ensured that the EPA would be apprised of possible environmental impacts 
of the operation so that it could utilize its expertise to determine whether 
the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines have been met and provide recommenda-
tions to the Corps to ensure that section 404 permits comply with the 
Guidelines. 
C. Legal Challenge to Enhanced Coordination Procedures 
Unhappy with the prospect of the EPA conducting the preliminary en-
vironmental review of its pending section 404 permit applications, the coal 
industry brought suit to enjoin use of the ECPs. The District Court for the 
District of Columbia in National Mining I144 enjoined the use of the ECPs, 
holding that the EPA improperly exceeded its statutory role in the section 
404 permitting regime and violated the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) by entering the plan without public notice and comments.145 The 
court later also vacated the Final Guidance in National Mining II, holding 
that the EPA exceeded its authority under SMCRA and CWA sections 303, 
402, and 404 in setting water quality guidelines.146 
                                                                                                                      
 141. Id. at 28. The Final Guidance also provided for EPA coordination with the states 
on section 402 permitting for coal mining operations. Id. at 11–26. 
 142. Id. at 31. 
 143. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607, 
662–63 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) rev’d sub nom. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 
F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 144. 816 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 145. Id. at 49. 
 146. Nos. 10-1220, 11-0295, 11-0446, 11-0447, 2012 WL 3090245, at *17 (D.D.C. 2012). 
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The court in National Mining I first addressed the argument that the 
EPA’s role in the MCIR Assessment and the EC Process exceeds the EPA’s 
statutory authority under the CWA.147 The plaintiffs argued that under 
Chevron step one, the CWA plainly limits the EPA’s role in the section 404 
process to: 
(1) developing the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines with the Corps for 
the Corps to apply when designating disposal sites; and (2) exercis-
ing its authority under Section 404(c) to prohibit the Corps’  
decision to issue a permit for a particular disposal site, but only if 
[it] follows the specified statutory and regulatory procedures gov-
erning the exercise of [Section 404(c) veto] authority.148 
The Government countered that the ECPs fall within the agencies’ “broad 
discretion to establish the procedures necessary to carry out their statutory 
functions.”149 Specifically, it pointed to section 404(q), which mandates 
coordination between the EPA and the Corps.150 The court found that 
section 404 is not ambiguous under Chevron step one: “[W]hile it is true 
that the EPA does have some role to play in the Section 404 permitting 
process, the carving out of limited circumstances for EPA involvement in the 
issuance of Section 404 permits appears to be a statutory ceiling on that 
involvement.”151 The court stated that the EPA only has authority to take 
five enumerated actions under section 404: “(1) work with the Corps to 
develop guidelines, [§ 404(b)(1)], (2) ‘prohibit the specification (including 
the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site’ after 
notice and opportunity for public hearings and consultation with the Corps, 
[§ 404(c)], (3) work with states desiring to administer their own permitting 
programs for dredge and fill material, [§ 404(g)–(j)], (4) promulgate cate-
gories of discharge that shall not require permits under a state permitting 
program, [§ 404(l)], and (5) enter into agreements with the Corps to min-
imize ‘duplication, needless paperwork, and delays in the issuance of 
permits,’ [§ 404(q)].”152 
The court went on to state that any gaps in the section 404 permitting 
scheme were to be filled by the Corps as the permitting authority, and that 
“the EPA is to play a lesser, clearly defined supporting role.”153 Because it 
                                                                                                                      
 147. 816 F. Supp. 2d at 42. 
 148. National Mining I, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (internal quotations omitted). 
 149. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 44 (emphasis added). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 44–45. 
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held that the EPA exceeded its authority under section 404, the court en-
joined use of the ECPs.154 
The court’s ruling, however, is contrary to the CWA and administrative 
law. First, the court incorrectly framed the inquiry under Chevron step one 
as whether the EPA’s section 404 role is limited solely to those tasks ex-
pressly delegated to the EPA. The CWA grants broad authority to the 
EPA: “Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, the Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency . . . shall administer this chap-
ter.”155 Here, the Administrator had determined that coordination between 
the Corps and the EPA in determining whether a permit meets the section 
404(b)(1) Guidelines was necessary to administer the CWA. The question 
in this case should thus be whether section 404 expressly prohibits the EPA 
from taking these necessary actions.  
The court relied on language that “[t]he Secretary may issue permits”156 
as providing an express limitation on the Administrator’s authority.157 The 
court incorrectly interpreted this language to entirely limit the EPA’s  
authority in section 404, subject to certain roles that have been expressly 
delegated to the EPA.158 This interpretation is overly broad. Section 404(a) 
does expressly prohibit the EPA from issuing fill permits, but it does not go 
so far as to completely cut the EPA out of section 404. The remainder of 
the section is still administered by the EPA, subject to express delegations 
to the Corps. Nothing in section 404 expressly limits the EPA’s general 
oversight role. Although section 404 delegates many tasks to the Corps, the 
delegations generally preserve a role for the EPA. This general oversight 
role can also be inferred from the legislative history discussed in Section 
I.A. supra. In addition, the Corps’ specification of disposal sites under 
section 404(b) is “[s]ubject to [§ 404(c)],”159 which involves EPA review.160 
                                                                                                                      
 154. Id. at 45. Alternatively, the court held that the ECPs must be set aside because 
they were promulgated without notice and comment, and did not fall into the APA exemp-
tion for “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” Id. at 45–49. “[P]rocedural 
rules are binding rules ‘that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties.’ ” Id. at 
45 (quoting Hurson Assocs., Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The 
court stated that the ECPs essentially change the reviewing authority for the permits, 
thereby altering the rights and interests of the applicants. National Mining I, 816 F. Supp. 2d 
at 47. This characterization is incorrect. Despite the ECPs’ effect of giving the EPA more of 
a role in the initial review process, the legal rights and interests of the applicants have not 
changed: the discharge must still comply with the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, the Corps 
still makes the ultimate determination of whether the permit complies with the Guidelines, 
the Corps is still the issuing authority, and the EPA still retains its section 404(c) veto 
authority. 
 155. CWA § 201(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 156. CWA § 404(a). 
 157. National Mining I, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 
 158. See id. 
 159. CWA § 404(b). 
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This implies that the Corps’ review of permits necessarily requires EPA 
review of the applications. 
Finally, section 404(q) essentially acknowledges the EPA’s oversight 
role by mandating coordination between the Corps and the EPA to mini-
mize delays in the issuance of permits.161 This section would be superfluous 
if the EPA did not have some role in section 404 permitting that could 
delay permit issuance. Section 404(q) does not expressly limit the contexts 
in which that coordination may occur. The generality of this provision 
leaves open the possibility that it applies to the Corps’ permitting process, 
resulting in ambiguity. The court in National Mining I did not address the 
government’s assertions that sections 404(b), (c), and (q) left room in the 
permitting process to be filled by EPA and Corps cooperation. The EPA 
must be involved with the Corps’ permitting process in order to effectively 
ensure its section 404(b) Guidelines are being followed and to determine 
whether a section 404(c) veto is proper. Section 404(q) appears to provide 
the EPA with the general oversight authority necessary to remain appraised 
of issues in Corps permitting. 
The National Mining I court was too quick to find clear congressional 
intent to limit the Administrator’s grant of authority.162 Nothing in section 
404 expressly limits this authority. In fact, the legislative history suggests 
that Congress contemplated that the EPA and Corps would coordinate with 
each other in review of permits.163 A court less willing to infer congressional 
intent would assess whether the ECPs are based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute under Chevron step two. The ECPs are not only 
compatible with the section 404 permitting scheme,164 but actually function 
to streamline the process as encouraged by section 404(q). In particular, 
section 404(c) allows the EPA to object to specification of disposal sites by 
the Corps. This subsection necessarily requires the EPA to review permits 
                                                                                                                      
 160. CWA § 404(c). 
 161. CWA § 404(q) (“[T]he Secretary [of the Army] shall enter into agreements with 
the Administrator [of the EPA] . . . to minimize, to the maximum extent practicable, 
duplication, needless paperwork, and delays in the issuance of permits under this section.”). 
 162. The federal government apparently agrees with this assessment of the district 
court’s decision, as it has indicated that it plans to appeal the case to the circuit court. See 
Alan Kovski, Court Rules EPA Erred in Using Guidance To Impose Conductivity Test on Coal 
Mines, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.bna.com/court-rules-epa-n12884910920/. 
 163. Senator Muskie’s discussion of section 404 indicated that the Corps was expected 
to transmit permit applications to the Administrator for review before the Corps took action 
on the application. See Senate Consideration, supra note 35, at 177. 
 164. The plaintiffs argued that the ECPs were not compatible with section 404 because 
any ambiguity in the statute had been clarified by the 1992 MOA. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. 
Jackson (National Mining I), 816 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43 (D.D.C. 2011). The court did not reach 
this argument, but it must fail because the 1992 MOA has minimal precedential value as a 
guidance document. Agencies are entitled to issue new guidance documents that supersede 
previous documents. The 1992 MOA has no more legal authority than the 2009 MOU.  
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before they are issued. The ECPs provide an opportunity for the EPA to 
review permit applications before the Corps has specified disposal sites and 
to notify the Corps of limits of specification that it would accept. The 
Corps can then issue a permit it knows will be acceptable to the EPA and 
can avoid a situation where it must spend extra time revising a permit after 
an EPA veto.  
The National Mining II court focused on the section 402 coordination 
procedures in the Final Guidance, but also vacated the section 404 envi-
ronmental review procedures.165 Regarding the latter procedures, the court 
summarily stated that “[u]nder the CWA, the EPA [does not] possess[] the 
authority to apply the 404(b)(1) Guidelines to Section 404 permits.”166 The 
court did not provide further analysis of the EPA’s application of the 
404(b)(1) Guidelines, but referred generally to National Mining I in support 
of its vacatur of the Final Guidance.167 
The section 404 review portion of the Final Guidance relied on the 
EPA’s authority under subsections 404(c) and 404(q).168 It is not surprising 
that the National Mining II court was not persuaded by that justification for 
the EPA’s oversight considering that the same court rejected that argument 
in National Mining I. However, the EPA’s general guidelines in the Final 
Guidance did not involve the sort of formal process that was condemned in 
National Mining I. Instead, under the Guidance, the EPA would have of-
fered comments to the Corps pursuant to the Corps’ own regulations that 
authorize the Corps to “seek the advice” of other federal agencies on “mat-
ters within the [other agency’s] special expertise.”169 Based on the National 
Mining decisions, it is clear that that court is opposed to any sort of EPA 
involvement in the Corps’ permitting that is not expressly enumerated in 
the CWA. 
Although the National Mining courts rejected the EPA’s invocation of 
sections 404(c) and (q) to determine its role in the review of pending fill 
applications, its ruling does not foreclose the use of those provisions going 
forward. After National Mining II, the EPA may still informally consult 
with the Corps on a permit application’s compliance with the 404(b)(1) 
Guidelines. EPA oversight is still permitted so long as it is not an an-
nounced, official policy. The effect of the National Mining cases, then, is a 
less transparent coordination process between the EPA and the Corps than 
                                                                                                                      
 165. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson (National Mining II), Nos. 10-1220, 11-0295, 11-
0446, 11-0447, 2012 WL 3090245, at *12 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. at *2 n.4. 
 168. See Final Guidance, supra note 140, at 27 (“Regions should be prepared and will-
ing to assist the Corps by . . . exercising EPA’s authorities under Sections 404(c) and 
404(q) of the CWA.”). 
 169. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(3) (2011). 
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existed under the ECPs and Final Guidance.170 Although the EPA’s com-
ments will likely be in the administrative record of any Corps decision, 
permit applicants (and mining opponents) will not know the degree of EPA 
involvement in the permit review until after the Corps makes a decision. 
Clearly the mining applicants would prefer that the EPA not be involved in 
the permit review.171 Yet, however unclear the EPA’s specific duties are 
under section 404, it is clear that the EPA must have some oversight role. 
Applicants would seem to benefit from the certainty of a designated process 
of EPA review, but the mining industry spurned that process in the course 
of bringing the National Mining suit. 
The 1992 MOA functioned to limit the EPA’s oversight of the Corps’ 
permitting, requiring only that the Corps consider comments from the 
EPA. The 2009 MOU greatly expanded the EPA’s oversight role and pro-
vided for enhanced coordination between the Corps and the EPA in  
evaluating section 404 permit applications as well as newly articulated 
ecological standards against which to evaluate the project. However, the 
validity of the 2009 MOU remains uncertain after much of the MOU was 
vacated in the National Mining I case. It is unclear to what extent the EPA 
will oversee the Corps’ permitting pending the outcome of an appeal of the 
National Mining cases. 
III. SCOPE OF EPA AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 404(C) 
Section 404(c) essentially provides the EPA with another way to limit 
the Corps’ section 404 jurisdiction by giving the agency veto power over 
the Corps’ permits. Specifically, subsection (c) states: 
The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification 
(including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a 
disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any 
defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specifi-
cation) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and 
opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of such materi-
als into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on 
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (includ-
                                                                                                                      
 170. Granted, the ECPs applied only to pending permit applications and were not 
necessarily proposed for use with future applications, but they may have been applied to new 
applications had they proven to be a successful method of evaluating pending applications. 
 171. The mining industry asserted that the new process would add “unreasonable 
delays” to approval of permits and could result in denials of permits based on the new 
criteria in the MCIR. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 37–38, Nat’l 
Mining Ass’n v. Jackson (National Mining I), 816 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:10-cv-
01220), 2010 WL 2910972. 
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ing spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. 
Before making such determination, the Administrator shall consult 
with the Secretary. The Administrator shall set forth in writing 
and make public his findings and his reasons for making any de-
termination under this subsection.172 
The EPA has been reluctant to invoke this provision, using it only thir-
teen times in its history. 173  There have been several attempts by 
environmental groups to compel the EPA to use its veto power, some of 
which have been successful.174 Other suits have sought to enjoin the EPA’s 
use of its veto power.175 However, the subsection is “so poorly written”176 
that courts have struggled to ascertain the exact authority the provision 
confers. 177  Courts have defined the provision’s authority inconsistently, 
leaving the scope of the EPA’s section 404(c) power an open question. I 
argue that section 404(c)’s grant of power to the EPA is broad and has been 
improperly limited by some courts. The broad grant of power provides the 
EPA with a general duty to consider whether each permit application 
should be vetoed and the authority to veto a permit either before or after it 
is issued. 
A. Attempts to Compel EPA Veto 
Cases dealing with efforts to compel the EPA to veto a Corps section 
404 permit are instructive on the authority conferred by section 404(c) 
because such cases turn on whether subsection (c) compels a nondiscretion-
ary duty of oversight on the EPA. The citizen suit provision of the CWA 
allows suits against the EPA only “where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
                                                                                                                      
 172. CWA § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. 1344(c) (2006). The EPA has promulgated regulations 
that establish the procedure by which the EPA will exercise its section 404(c) authority. See 
40 C.F.R. § 231. For a good example of the EPA’s process in issuing a section 404(c) veto, 
see Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs v. E.P.A., 785 F. Supp. 2d 592, 600–04 (N.D. Miss. 2011). 
 173. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(C) 
FACT SHEET, available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/404c.pdf. 
 174. See, e.g., Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs (P.E.A.C.H. II), 87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996) aff ’g (P.E.A.C.H. I) 915 F. Supp. 378, 
381 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988); Alliance 
to Save the Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007); City 
of Olmsted Falls v. EPA, 266 F. Supp. 2d 718 (N.D. Ohio 2003), aff ’d 435 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
 175. See, e.g., James City Cnty, Va. v. EPA (James City IV), 12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012); City of Alma v. United 
States, 744 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D. Ga. 1990). 
 176. Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 140. 
 177. See, e.g., id.  
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discretionary with the Administrator.”178 Therefore, if the EPA’s duties under 
section 404(c) are discretionary, the agency cannot be sued under the citi-
zen suit provision for its failure to veto a permit under section 404(c). The 
circuits have split on this question. Although deciding the question of sec-
tion 404(c) discretion differently, the courts’ opinions consistently suggest 
that the EPA has a general oversight duty in the Corps’ permit decisions. 
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Preserve  
Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(“P.E.A.C.H. I”) held that the EPA’s section 404(c) duty is discretionary 
and the agency could therefore not be sued under the CWA’s citizen suit 
provision.179 The plaintiffs in that case brought suit under the CWA’s citi-
zen suit provision, alleging inter alia that the EPA violated the CWA in 
failing to veto a Corps’ wetland fill permit.180 The district court dismissed 
the claim on the grounds that CWA section 505 (the citizen suit provision) 
does not waive sovereign immunity for challenges to the EPA’s nondiscre-
tionary duties.181 It pointed to the plain language of section 404(c) as  
evidence of the discretionary nature of the EPA’s duty: “The use of the 
term ‘authorize’ (as opposed to ‘shall’) suggests a discretionary function.”182 
The Eleventh Circuit agreed on appeal, holding in P.E.A.C.H. II that “by 
statute, the Administrator is authorized rather than mandated to overrule 
the Corps[,]” and therefore cannot be sued under the CWA for failure to 
exercise this authority.183 
The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio followed the 
P.E.A.C.H. holdings in Olmsted Falls II.184 The plaintiffs in that case in-
voked the judicial review provision of the APA, rather than the CWA 
citizen suit provision, to challenge the EPA’s failure to veto a Corps permit 
under section 404(c).185 The court cited P.E.A.C.H. II and noted that the 
conclusion in that case was buttressed by the discretionary nature of the 
EPA’s regulations outlining its section 404(c) procedure.186 The plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                      
 178. CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006). 
 179. 915 F. Supp. at 381. 
 180. See id. 
 181. Id. The court also foreclosed the possibility of review under the APA. Id. (“While 
the APA does indeed provide an extensive judicial review procedure, it expressly states that 
such procedure applies ‘except to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law.’ 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. P.E.A.C.H. II, 87 F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 184. City of Olmsted Falls v. EPA (Olmsted Falls II), 266 F. Supp. 2d 718, 723 (N.D. 
Ohio 2003). 
 185. Id. at 721. The plaintiffs had earlier brought suit under the CWA’s citizen suit 
provision, but that claim was dismissed for the plaintiffs’ failure to provide the EPA with 60 
days’ notice of suit as required by that provision. City of Olmsted Falls v. EPA (Olmsted 
Falls I), 233 F. Supp. 2d 890, 896–97 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 186. Olmsted Falls II, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 723. 
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had also argued that the publication of section 404(b)(1) Guidelines created 
a nondiscretionary duty for the EPA to ensure that the Corps abides by the 
Guidelines in issuing permits.187 The court rejected this argument, finding 
that the Guidelines only create a duty for the Corps to comply.188 
The Fourth Circuit conversely has held that the EPA has a mandatory 
duty under section 404(c) to consider Corps’ permits for possible veto.189 
The court of appeals in National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson interpreted 
section 505(a)(2) to “allow citizens to sue the Administrator and join the 
Corps when the Corps abdicates its responsibility to make reasoned wet-
lands determinations and the Administrator fails to exercise the duty of oversight 
imposed by [§ 404(c)].”190 Although the court was ruling on whether the 
Corps could be joined in a section 505(a)(2) suit, the statement has been 
interpreted by district courts in the circuit to mean that the EPA’s section 
404(c) oversight duty is nondiscretionary. 191  In Tidwell, the plaintiffs 
brought suit against the EPA and the Corps pursuant to section 505(a)(2) 
and the APA for failing to require a section 404 permit.192 The court stated 
that “under the ruling in Hanson, the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to 
regulate dredged or fill material under [CWA § 404,]” and may thus be 
sued under the CWA’s citizen suit provision.193 Because the plaintiffs had 
“an adequate remedy under the citizen suit of the CWA[,]” the court ruled 
that they could not also proceed under the APA.194 
Another district court in South Carolina Coastal Conservation League ex-
amined the Tidwell and Hanson cases and came to the same conclusion: that 
section 404(c) imposes a nondiscretionary duty on the EPA.195 That court 
expressly disagreed with the holdings in P.E.A.C.H. II and Olmsted Falls II.196 
Instead, the court read Hanson broadly to suggest that the EPA’s nondiscre-
tionary duty could extend to “every time the Corps grants a Section 404 
                                                                                                                      
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. The National Mining II court came to a similar conclusion in vacating the EPA’s 
Final Guidance. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson (National Mining II), Nos. 10-1220, 11-0295, 
11-0446, 11-0447, 2012 WL 3090245, at *12 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 189. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 190. Id. (emphasis added). 
 191. See, e.g., S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 
2:07-3802, 2008 WL 4280376, at *8 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2008); Envtl. Defense Fund v. Tidwell, 
837 F. Supp. 1344, 1354 (E.D.N.C. 1992). 
 192. 837 F. Supp. at 1347–48. 
 193. Id. at 1354. 
 194. Id. at 1357 (applying 5 U.S.C. § 704, which allows suit under the APA for “[a]gency 
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate 
remedy in a court” (emphasis added)). 
 195. 2008 WL 4280376, at *8. 
 196. Id. at *5. 
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permit.”197 Again, the court held that the plaintiff could not sustain an APA 
suit where the CWA provided an adequate remedy.198 
Conversely, the District Court for the District of Columbia held in Al-
liance to Save the Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that plaintiffs 
could bring suit against the EPA for its failure to veto a permit under the 
APA, but not under the CWA’s citizen suit provision.199 The plaintiffs in 
Mattaponi argued in their section 505(a)(2) claim, that “under § 404(c), 
EPA has a general implied nondiscretionary duty to oversee the permitting 
process, and, [that] its decision not to veto evinced a failure to perform that 
duty.”200 The court cited the P.E.A.C.H. and Olmsted Falls II cases in hold-
ing that the EPA did not have a nondiscretionary duty to veto the 
permit.201 The court did not expressly reject that section 404(c) imposes a 
general duty for the EPA to oversee the Corps’ permitting process, but 
stated that the plaintiffs had provided no evidence that the EPA breached 
such duty.202 However, the court found that the APA’s exclusion of suits 
against “decisions committed to agency discretion by law” is to be read 
narrowly.203 It then held that the EPA’s decision not to veto the Corps’ 
permit is not the sort of decision that is committed to agency discretion, 
but instead amounted to an action reviewable under the APA’s arbitrary and 
capricious standard.204 
Although these cases deal with whether the EPA is amenable to suit, 
their holdings are based on the level of duty conferred on the EPA by sec-
tion 404(c). The cases deal with two different duties of the EPA: (1) the 
duty to veto a Corps permit if it fails to meet section 404(c) standards; and 
(2) a general duty conferred by section 404(c) to oversee the permit process 
and ensure that the Corps properly applies the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.  
Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit cases, the EPA’s veto power is 
clearly discretionary. It is difficult to argue with the statutory interpretation 
in the P.E.A.C.H. and Olmsted Falls II cases. The word “authorized” clearly 
indicates a discretionary duty.205 None of the other courts identified lan-
guage mandating EPA veto action. The Hanson court seemed only to read a 
general duty into section 404(c) without mentioning specific actions the 
                                                                                                                      
 197. Id. at *7–8 (rejecting the EPA’s attempt to narrow Hanson to its facts). 
 198. Id. at *8. 
 199. 515 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 200. Id. at 5. 
 201. Mattaponi, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 4–5. 
 202. Id. at 5. 
 203. See id. at 7. 
 204. See id. at 7–9. 
 205. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835–36 (1985) (interpreting “authorized” to 
“commit complete discretion” to the agency head). 
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EPA was required to take.206 Even if the Fourth Circuit in Hanson was 
correct in inferring a general duty, the district courts improperly extended 
that duty to constitute a nondiscretionary EPA duty to decide whether to 
veto any permit issued by the Corps. The district court in Mattaponi cor-
rectly decided that the section 404(c) duty was discretionary under the 
CWA citizen suit provision. However, it is strange that that court simulta-
neously held that the same duty was not committed to agency discretion 
under the APA. The court justified its decision on the different standards 
for how narrowly “discretion” applies in CWA section 505(a)(2) and APA 
section 701(a)(2). This distinction may be technically correct but leads to 
the counterintuitive result in Mattaponi. Based on this precedent, the avail-
ability of judicial review of the EPA’s section 404(c) action (or inaction) is 
unclear. 
However, these decisions are not necessarily incompatible with the 
concept of a general oversight duty of the EPA under section 404(c). The 
Fourth Circuit cases did not mandate that the EPA actually veto the Corps’ 
permits, only that the EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to consider whether 
the permits should be vetoed. Likewise, the P.E.A.C.H. and Olmsted Falls II 
cases did not state that the EPA has no duty to review the Corps’ permits, 
only that its decision not to veto the permits is discretionary. The Hanson 
court’s suggestion that the EPA has a duty to oversee the Corps’ permitting 
process, therefore, seems to be an accurate description of the law. The Mat-
taponi court made clear that the EPA has standards by which to assess the 
Corps’ decisions, and the agency should apply those standards.  
This line of cases seems to provide the EPA with justification to be in-
volved in the Corps’ permit review in some sense. The case law supports 
the EPA’s guidance for review of mountaintop removal valley fill applica-
tions going forward. If, however, the EPA does not exercise this sort of 
review in Appalachia, plaintiffs will likely get judicial review because most 
mountaintop removal permits are executed in the Fourth Circuit, which 
follows Hanson and its progeny. 
B. Challenge to EPA’s Use of Veto Power 
As stated supra, the EPA has only exercised its veto power thirteen 
times.207 The EPA has issued just two vetoes since 1989,208 and both of 
those have been challenged in court.209 Challenges to the EPA’s use of its 
                                                                                                                      
 206. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1988) (referencing 
the Administrator’s failure “to exercise the duty of oversight imposed by [CWA § 404(c)]”). 
 207. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 173. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2012) (chal-
lenged on grounds that the EPA exceeded its section 404(c) authority); Bd. of Miss. Levee 
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veto power have centered on either the EPA’s substantive decision210 or the 
scope of the agency’s veto power.211  
1. Substantive Challenges 
Section 404(c) provides standards to be considered by the Administra-
tor in making the veto determination: “whenever he determines . . . that 
the discharge of [fill] materials into such area will have an unacceptable 
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas 
(including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.”212 
Substantive challenges to a veto generally assert that the Administrator acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in the way in which he considered these standards. 
In the James City series of cases, the plaintiff asserted that the EPA vio-
lated section 404(c)’s substantive standards by vetoing a Corps permit based 
on unsubstantiated evidence and on improper standards.213 The dispute 
centered on a proposed fill-based dam to create a reservoir.214 The county 
had applied to the Corps for a section 404 permit, which the Corps  
announced it would grant in a Record of Decision.215 The EPA, however, 
vetoed the Corps’ decision just four months after it was announced (but 
before the permit was issued).216 The EPA stated that the dam would have 
an “unacceptable adverse effect” because there were “practicable, less envi-
ronmentally damaging alternatives” available to the county.217 The district 
court overturned the EPA’s veto, holding that the EPA’s alternatives finding 
was not supported by the evidence.218 The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, 
holding that the EPA’s decision was unsupported by “substantial evidence,” 
while also remanding the case to the EPA for reconsideration.219 The EPA 
again vetoed the permit on the grounds that the adverse environmental 
effect would be unacceptable.220 The district court held that the EPA’s 
                                                                                                                      
Comm’rs v. EPA, 785 F. Supp. 2d 592, 600–04 (N.D. Miss. 2011) (challenged on grounds 
that project was immune from section 404(c) power because its EIS had been submitted to 
Congress pursuant to section 404(r)). 
 210. See, e.g., James City Cnty. v. EPA (James City I), 758 F. Supp. 348, 353 (E.D. Va. 
1990); City of Alma v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 1546, 1563 (S.D. Ga. 1990). 
 211. See, e.g., Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 134. 
 212. CWA § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006). 
 213. See James City I, 758 F. Supp. 348, 351–52, aff ’d in part & remanded, (James City II) 
955 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1992), rev’d, (James City III) No. 89-156, 1992 WL 315199 (E.D. Va. 
Aug. 5, 1992), rev’d, (James City IV), 12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 214. James City I, 758 F. Supp. at 349. 
 215. Id. at 350. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 351. 
 218. Id. at 353. 
 219. James City II, 955 F.2d 254, 260–61 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 220. See James City III, No. 89-156, 1992 WL 315199, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 1992). 
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second veto was contrary to law because the agency failed to consider neces-
sary factors (i.e., the county’s need for water) and its environmental 
determination was unsubstantiated by the evidence.221 The Fourth Circuit 
overturned the district court’s ruling, holding that Congress clearly intend-
ed for the EPA to give primary consideration to environmental effects in its 
veto decision.222 The court also held that the EPA’s finding was supported 
by substantial evidence.223 
The James City line of cases demonstrates a typical approach to judicial 
review of agency decisionmaking. All four cases considered whether the 
EPA had based its decision on substantial evidence under APA section 
706(2)(E). Although the analysis in those cases presents a good example of 
the sort of evidence reviewed in the section 404(c) veto process, it sheds 
little light on the scope of the EPA’s decisionmaking power in that process. 
James City III and James City IV addressed the scope of factors that the EPA 
may consider in making its decision. The circuit court made clear that the 
EPA is entitled to broad deference in weighing relevant factors to make its 
section 404(c) decision.224 The Fourth Circuit also explained its view of the 
partitioning of roles in section 404: 
Congress obviously intended the Corps of Engineers in the  
initial permitting process to consider the total range of factors 
bearing on the necessity or desirability of building a dam in the 
Nation’s waters, including whether the project was in the public  
interest . . . . Ultimately, however, recognizing the EPA’s expertise 
and concentrated concern with environmental matters, Congress gave 
the final decision whether to permit a project to that agency. Its au-
thority to veto to protect the environment is practically unadorned.225 
In other words, the EPA has the last word in analyzing the environ-
mental impacts of a section 404 permit. Based on these cases, an EPA 
section 404(c) action should be upheld so long as it is based on environ-
mental considerations and supported by substantial evidence as required by 
APA section 706(2)(E). 
                                                                                                                      
 221. Id. 
 222. James City IV, 12 F.3d 1330, 1335–36 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 223. Id. at 1339. 
 224. See id. at 1336 (“This broad grant of power to the EPA focuses only on the agen-
cy’s assigned function of assuring pure water and is consistent with the missions assigned to 
it throughout the Clean Water Act.”). 
 225. Id. at 1335–36. 
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2. Challenge to Scope of Power 
In contrast to substantive challenges, the recent Mingo Logan case in-
volves a challenge to the scope of the EPA’s power to invoke its section 
404(c) authority; namely whether that authority disappears once the Corps 
issues a permit.226 As part of the Obama Administration’s shift to greater 
EPA involvement in mountaintop removal permitting, the EPA reviewed a 
section 404 permit that the Corps had issued to the Mingo Logan Coal 
Company in January 2007 for valley fills associated with its Spruce No. 1 
coal mine.227 The EPA issued its final decision to withdraw the specification 
of two stream disposal sites from the permit in January 2011, nearly four 
years after the Corps’ permit was issued.228 Mingo Logan brought suit 
under the APA, alleging, inter alia, that the EPA’s section 404(c) authority 
was not so broad as to give it the power to withdraw the specification of a 
disposal site after the permit had been issued.229  
The court held that the EPA exceeded its authority as explicitly dele-
gated by Congress, and, in the alternative, that the EPA’s interpretation of 
section 404(c) was not reasonable.230 In analyzing the EPA’s assertion of 
                                                                                                                      
 226. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 227. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY PURSUANT TO § 404(C) OF THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT CONCERNING THE SPRUCE NO. 1 MINE, LOGAN COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA, at 21 (Jan. 
13, 2011) [hereinafter SPRUCE DETERMINATION], available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/ 
guidance/cwa/dredgdis/upload/Spruce_No-_1_Mine_Final_Determination_011311_signed.pdf. 
Note that Spruce No. 1 mine was the same mine at issue in the Bragg cases in note 74 supra. 
The EPA’s renewed concern over the Spruce No. 1 mine was based on the expanse of ecolog-
ically-important headwater streams that would be buried as a result of the mining. SPRUCE 
DETERMINATION, supra note 227, at 7 (noting that impacts of the projects would include 
“the direct burial of 6.6 miles of high quality stream habitat, including all wildlife in this 
watershed that utilize these streams for all or part of their life cycles”). 
 228. SPRUCE DETERMINATION, supra note 227, at 99. The legal history of the Spruce 
No. 1 mine is lengthy. The Corps originally permitted its associated valley fills via a NWP 21 
permit, which was challenged in Bragg I and subsequently revoked. See supra note 74. Mingo 
Logan then applied for an individual section 404 permit from the Corps. The Corps con-
ducted an environmental review of the project that culminated in the issuance of a final EIS 
in September 2006. Although the EPA expressed numerous concerns about the project 
throughout the review, it did not ultimately veto the permit when the Corps issued it in 
2007. However, two years later, the EPA asked the Corps to “use its discretionary authority 
provided by 33 CFR 325.7 to suspend, revoke, or modify the permit” based on “recent data 
and analyses [that] had revealed downstream water quality impacts that were not adequately 
addressed by the permit.” The Corps rejected the EPA’s request, so the EPA acted under its 
section 404(c) authority to withdraw the specified disposal sites in 2011. See Mingo Logan, 
850 F. Supp. 2d at 135–37. 
 229. See Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 134. Because the suit was brought in the D.C. 
District, the court’s precedent in Mattaponi allowed suit against the EPA for abuse of its 
section 404(c) power under the APA. See generally Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 230. Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 134. 
Eaton_Final_WEB 1/22/2013  1:47 PM 
260 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:1 
jurisdiction under Chevron step one, the court examined whether Congress 
had clearly granted the EPA the power to “exercise a post-permit veto.”231 
The court held that the statutory language “does not expressly authorize 
[the EPA] to exercise the power it purported to exercise here,” 232 and that 
the statutory structure and legislative history indicate that “Congress antic-
ipated that EPA would act before a permit was issued,” not after.233 
Therefore, the court held, the EPA’s action “could be deemed to be unlaw-
ful at the first step of the Chevron analysis.”234 The court went on to hold 
that even if the statute was ambiguous, the EPA’s interpretation of its au-
thority was not reasonable under Chevron step two. It first decided that the 
EPA was not entitled to complete deference because section 404 is primari-
ly administered by the Corps.235 The court went on to reason that allowing 
revocation of a permit would be “illogical and impractical” and that the 
EPA’s own regulations and its 1992 MOA with the Corps indicate that the 
EPA’s exercise of its veto authority would occur before a permit was is-
sued.236 The court thus overturned the EPA’s veto and held that the EPA 
lacks the power to revoke a section 404 permit once it has been issued by 
the Corps.237 
While the EPA’s new comprehensive review procedures would theoreti-
cally avoid the issuance of permits that the EPA will later find cause to 
                                                                                                                      
 231. Id. at 139. 
 232. Id. at 142. 
 233. Id. at 147. The court also went on to reject cases presented by the EPA in support 
of the agency’s position as “not controlling or persuasive.” Id. 
 234. Id. at 148.  
 235. Id. at 149 (citing Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 
2003)) The court explained that: 
[W]hen more than one agency is tasked with administering the statute, the de-
termination of how much deference the court owes any one of those agencies is 
not so straightforward. In Collins v. National Transp. Safety Board, 351 F.3d 1246 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), the D.C. Circuit set out three different types of shared en-
forcement schemes: 
• For generic statutes like the APA, FOIA, and FACA, the broadly sprawling ap-
plicability undermines any basis for deference, and courts must therefore review 
interpretative questions de novo; 
• For statutes like the FDIA, where the agencies have specialized enforcement re-
sponsibilities but their authority potentially overlaps—thus creating risks of 
inconsistency or uncertainty—de novo review may also be necessary; 
• For statutes where expert enforcement agencies have mutually exclusive authori-
ty over separate sets of regulated persons, the above concerns do not work against 
application of Chevron deference. 
Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 148–49. 
 236. Id. at 152–53.  
 237. Id. at 153. 
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revoke, the Mingo Logan case severely restricts the EPA’s section 404 power. 
The holding prevents the EPA from revoking a permit after it has been 
issued for any reason, even if the EPA finds that the fill operation is having 
a significantly greater detrimental effect on the environment than anticipat-
ed. However, the rationale behind the holding in this case may have even 
further-reaching effects. The court made clear that it interpreted section 
404 to give ultimate authority to the Corps, stating that the EPA could not 
take action that would run contrary to the “exclusive permitting authority 
accorded the Corps in section 404(a).”238 Further, it interpreted the legisla-
tive history to indicate an “understanding that EPA’s responsibilities were 
to be limited to those specifically assigned.”239  
The court’s rationale was similar to that in National Mining I and is 
flawed for many of the same reasons. For one, it seemed to put the burden 
on the EPA to show that Congress clearly indicated that it may exercise its 
veto power after issuance of a permit.240 After explicitly stating that “the 
text [of § 404(c)] is ambiguous[,]”241 the court relied on flimsy evidence to 
clarify the ambiguity.  
The court claimed that the combination of section 404(a) (granting the 
Corps power to issue permits), section 404(p) (compliance with a section 
404(a) permit establishes compliance with the CWA), and section 404(q) 
(the EPA and the Corps should coordinate to reduce delays in permitting) 
indicate a clear congressional intent to preclude post-permit vetoes.242 The 
court stated that sections 404(a) and 404(p) indicate that a Corps permit is 
intended to be final and provide assurance that proposed discharges will not 
later be challenged.243 In addition, it averred that the objective in section 
404(q) to avoid delays in permitting suggests that the permitting process 
should not be disrupted, especially after a permit has been issued.244 
The court then found that a single sentence in the legislative history 
was sufficient to support this congressional intent in the absence of any 
statements clearly supporting the EPA position: “[P]rior to the issuance of 
any permit to dispose of spoil, the Administrator must determine that the 
material to be disposed of will not adversely affect municipal water sup-
plies.”245 
                                                                                                                      
 238. Id. at 144. 
 239. Id. at 146. 
 240. Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (“There is no question that the sole provision 
relied upon by EPA does not expressly authorize it to exercise the power it purported to 
exercise here, so the case cannot be resolved in EPA’s favor on Chevron I grounds.”). 
 241. Id. at 142. 
 242. Id. at 143–44. 
 243. Id. at 143. 
 244. Id. at 144. 
 245. Id. at 144 (quoting Senate Consideration, supra note 35, at 177). 
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The evidence cited by the court in no way indicates a clear congression-
al intent to limit the EPA’s veto authority to pre-permit issuance. The 
language in 404(c) is ambiguous. The court brushed aside the EPA’s asser-
tion that the phrase “whenever he determines” implies that the Administrator 
may exercise the veto at any time.246 Even if this phrase does not clearly 
indicate that the Administrator may issue a post-permit veto, it at least 
suggests that he may have this power. The court struggled with the import 
of the parenthetical “including the withdrawal of specification” phrase, 
ultimately deciding that the phrase could simply give the EPA authority to 
withdraw specification of disposal sites that had been made before enact-
ment of the CWA but before those permits had been issued.247 While this 
reading could be correct, the phrase is not unambiguous. It is equally likely 
that the phrase allows the Administrator to withdraw a specification after a 
permit has been issued. Where a phrase is capable of multiple meanings, 
courts are reluctant to find that Congress has clearly spoken to the issue.248  
The court’s assertion that sections 404(a) and 404(p) provide a finality 
that clearly precludes the EPA from issuing a post-permit veto is unfounded. 
The Corps’ own regulations provide that it may amend or revoke a permit 
after it has been issued, although section 404 does not explicitly confer that 
authority.249 Although this withdrawal of authority would have the same 
nullifying effect as the EPA post-permit veto on the “finality” of a section 
404 permit, it has been upheld in court.250 The Mingo Logan court provided 
no rationale for why the EPA’s post-permit withdrawal is any more egre-
gious than a post-permit withdrawal by the Corps. The “finality” that the 
court claimed was clearly intended by Congress is not present in the statute. 
At most, the question of finality is ambiguous. Without sufficiently demon-
strating clear congressional intent, the court demonstrated another example 
of the “pliable” application of Chevron step one complained of by some 
commenters.251 
The ambiguity in section 404(c) should have led the court to Chevron 
step two, where it would apply the highly deferential “permissible construc-
tion” standard. The court did begin a move towards this analysis as an 
alternate rationale for its holding, but stopped short of granting the EPA 
                                                                                                                      
 246. See Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 140–41. 
 247. See id. at 140 n.6. 
 248. See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 249. 33 C.F.R. § 325.7 (2012). 
 250. See, e.g., Boll v. Safe Harbor Marina, Ltd., 114 Fed. App’x 467, 468 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 251. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 817–22 (2010); 
Matthew C. Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 Va. L. Rev. 
597 (2009). 
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deference.252 In what was perhaps the most surprising conclusion of the 
case, the court held that the EPA is entitled to little, if any, deference in its 
interpretation of section 404(c) because the section is primarily adminis-
tered by the Corps. 253  This holding would strictly limit any EPA 
interpretation of section 404(c) to only those interpretations that are clearly 
and unambiguously conveyed by the text of the statute. 
The court’s holding here is inappropriate, given that the CWA states 
that it is to be administered by the Administrator of the EPA, “[e]xcept as 
otherwise expressly provided.”254 Section 404 does not “expressly provide” 
that the Secretary of the Army administer that entire section, much less 
section 404(c). The court suggested that the requirement that the Adminis-
trator “consult” with the Secretary of the Army before vetoing a permit 
means that the provision is jointly administered.255 Again, this rationale is 
flawed. The provision requires no action on the part of the Secretary, so he 
is not tasked with administering the provision in any way. Even if section 
404 is considered to be jointly administered, the concern with granting 
deference in such a situation would be that the agencies would issue con-
flicting interpretations of the statute, creating uncertainty among regulated 
parties.256 Because section 404(c) involves only actions taken by the EPA, 
the EPA’s own interpretation is the only one that would have an effect on 
regulated entities.257 The court did not give sufficient reason for the EPA 
not to receive deference in its interpretation of this provision. 
Even with limited deference, the EPA’s interpretation was not unrea-
sonable. The text of section 404(c) is ambiguous and does not limit the 
timeframe in which the EPA could issue a veto. In addition, the EPA’s 
ability to withdraw a permit does not “sow a lack of certainty” any more 
than the Corps’ ability to do so.258 The court also asserted that the EPA’s 
interpretation was unreasonable because it was not explained in the 1992 
MOA or other regulations.259 While such lack of notice does not necessarily 
                                                                                                                      
 252. See Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d, at 148–51. 
 253. Id. at 148–49. 
 254. See CWA § 101(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2006). 
 255. See Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 149.  
 256. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 
833, 895 (2001). 
 257. For example, if the Corps’ interpretation was that the EPA could issue a post-
permit veto, but the EPA believed it could not do so, regulated entities would never experi-
ence such a veto. Conversely, if the EPA believed it could issue a post-permit veto and the 
Corps held the opposite view, the Corps could not prevent the EPA from notifying  
permitholders that a specification on their permit had been revoked.  
 258. Mingo Logan, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 152. 
 259. See id. at 152–53. 
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make the EPA’s interpretation unreasonable,260 it would be advisable for the 
EPA to explain its post-permit section 404(c) procedures in either a guid-
ance document or its official regulations. 
The Justice Department has appealed the case to the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals.261 The circuit court will likely begin by 
conducting a Chevron step one analysis. It could agree with the district 
court and find that Congress clearly indicated that the EPA may not veto a 
permit after it has been issued. Alternatively, the court could overturn the 
district court’s decision by finding that Congress clearly indicated that the 
EPA may veto a permit after it has been issued. Finally, in what I have 
argued is the correct approach, the court can find that Congress has not 
spoken clearly to that question and would then proceed to a Chevron step 
two analysis. The circuit court could adopt the district court’s step two 
analysis and hold that the EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable. More cor-
rectly, the court can and should afford the EPA’s interpretation more 
deference than did the district court and hold that the EPA’s interpretation 
is reasonable. 
The district court in Mingo Logan failed to give sufficient deference to 
the EPA under Chevron step two, especially considering the ambiguity in 
section 404. Under the deferential standard, the EPA has authority to 
withdraw a permit’s specification of disposal sites even after the permit has 
been issued. If the district court’s ruling stands, the EPA’s ability to inter-
pret its role in section 404 and participate in the section 404 permitting 
process will be strictly limited. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the initial intent for the Corps’ role to be a continuation of its 
duties in the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Corps has gradually extended its 
jurisdiction under section 404 to issue permits for discharges of pollutants 
that marginally qualify as fill material into waters that are not used for 
navigation. It is doubtful that Congress intended the Corps’ jurisdiction to 
                                                                                                                      
 260. Agencies are permitted to invoke interpretations of law for the first time at an 
adjudication without providing prior notice. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 
759, 765–66 (1969) (“Adjudicated cases may and do, of course, serve as vehicles for the 
formulation of agency policies, which are applied and announced therein.”). 
 261. See Initial Brief of Defendant-Appellant United States Environmental Protection 
Agency at 1, Mingo Logan Coal Co., Inc. v. EPA (2012) (No. 12-5150), 2012 WL 2933683 at 
*1 (stating the question for review as “[d]oes § 404(c) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(c), authorize EPA to withdraw specification of navigable waters as disposal sites for 
fill material after the Corps issues a § 404(a) permit for disposal in those sites?”). 
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extend so broadly into a sphere that at least the Senate believed would be 
run by the EPA.262  
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Kentuckians II failed to adequately con-
sider congressional intent in upholding the Corps’ “effects-based” definition 
of “fill material.” Even if Congress had not spoken clearly as to whether fill 
lacking a constructive purpose could be “fill material” under section 404, 
the legislative history is clear that the Corps’ definition of “fill material” 
was not a reasonable construction of the statute. 
The Supreme Court failed to clarify the statutory definition of “fill ma-
terial” in Coeur. The Court accepted the Corps’ regulatory definition at face 
value without inquiring whether it comported with the statute. In doing so, 
the Court issued a decision that provides tacit approval of that regulatory 
definition. The result of Kentuckians II and Coeur is that the weight of the 
case law supports the Corps’ acceptance of jurisdiction over permitting 
valley fills associated with mountaintop removal mining. Other commenta-
tors have argued that, because those cases were wrongly decided, the EPA 
should retake jurisdiction over such fills from the Corps. In this Note, I 
assume that the EPA will not do so, especially considering the present 
political environment that is so hostile towards the EPA. Instead, I have 
examined the scope of oversight that the EPA may exercise over the Corps’ 
section 404 permitting process. 
Only recently has the EPA pushed back on the Corps’ jurisdiction via 
the EPA’s oversight authority. The courts, however, have improperly limited 
the EPA’s power under section 404. The provision that was intended to be a 
carve-out in the CWA for the Corps to exercise limited jurisdiction has 
now been interpreted to give the Corps broad authority, with only limited 
carve-outs for the EPA’s involvement. The government has correctly decid-
ed to appeal the decisions in Mingo Logan and National Mining that limited 
the EPA’s oversight power. Should the circuit court overturn those deci-
sions, the EPA will be able to exercise the oversight authority and duty to 
the fullest extent intended by Congress. The broad scope of EPA oversight 
is necessary to compensate for the degree of agency capture that has oc-
curred between the mountaintop removal mining industry and the Corps.263 
The regulatory and legal history of the use of section 404 to regulate 
mining overburden demonstrates the problems that come with poor legisla-
tive drafting, especially at the Conference Committee level where section 
404 was integrated into the Senate bill. Many of the new processes for EPA 
                                                                                                                      
 262. The Senate’s version of the CWA did not include any provisions for the Corps to 
issue discharge permits. Under that version, the EPA was to be the sole agency overseeing 
the discharge permit system. See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3668. 
 263. See Evans, supra note 1, at 551–54 (describing the Corps’ susceptibility to influ-
ence from the mining industry). 
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oversight initially seemed to provide some solution to the use of section 404 
to regulate mining overburden; yet the fate of those processes now lies with 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Assuming the 
circuit court reinstates those processes, their efficacy will still be contingent 
on future presidential administrations’ allowance of the EPA’s oversight of 
the Corps’ permitting. 
Considering the biodiversity and ecological sensitivity of Appalachia’s 
mountain ecosystems, rigorous environmental review of mountaintop re-
moval mining operations is necessary. The Corps has failed in that duty to 
date, and the EPA has not provided a necessary check on the process. In-
creasing the EPA’s role will provide for the proper consideration of the 
environmental impacts of mountaintop removal mining that is necessary 
before Appalachia’s forest and aquatic ecosystems are irreversibly destroyed. 
